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The folly of forecasting: The effects of a disaggregated demand forecasting system on 
forecast error, forecast positive bias, and inventory levels 
 
ABSTRACT 
Periodic demand forecasts are the primary planning and coordination mechanism within 
organizations. Because most demand forecasts incorporate human judgment, they are subject 
to both unintentional error and intentional opportunistic bias. We examine whether a 
disaggregation of the forecast into various sources of demand reduces forecast error and bias. 
Using proprietary data from a manufacturing organization, we find that absolute demand 
forecast error declines following the implementation of a disaggregated forecast system. We 
also find a favorable effect of forecast disaggregation on finished goods inventory without a 
corresponding increase in costly production plan changes. We further document a decline in 
positive forecast bias, except for products whose production is limited owing to scarce 
production resources. This implies that disaggregation alone is not sufficient to overcome 
heightened incentives of self-interested sales managers to positively bias the forecast for the 
very products that an organization would like to avoid tying up in inventory. 
 
Key Words: Budgeting, forecasting, forecast disaggregation, forecast error, forecast bias, 
inventory management, sales and operations planning 
Data Availability: Data are the property of the research partner and may not be redistributed 
by the authors. 
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1. Introduction 
Demand forecast accuracy is critical to operational decisions and to firms’ overall 
financial performance. Demand forecast error results in lost sales for production and service 
organizations alike, and for production firms, it results in production plan instability that 
leads to increased overtime, materials and freight costs, and potentially lower product 
quality. There is also emerging evidence (e.g., Kroos et al. 2018) that demand forecast error 
undermines an organization’s ability to provide accurate management earnings forecasts to 
the capital market. The typical responses to forecast error, excess capacity and/or inventory 
“safety stock,” are themselves costly. It is not surprising that CFOs name “forecast error” as 
their top “internal concern” (Sivabalan et al. 2009) and identify demand forecasting as one of 
their top organizational priorities (FERF 2016).  
Demand forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between the forecast of 
unit demand provided by the sales side of an organization and actual unit sales. 
Approximately 70 percent or organizations rely on managerial judgment, either exclusively 
or in combination with statistical forecasting models (e.g., time series models such as 
exponential smoothing) in forecasting demand (Fildes et al. 2008; Fildes and Petropoulos 
2015). Managerial adjustments to baseline statistical forecasts are used to incorporate into the 
forecast information that is not reflected in historical data. While these adjustments do appear 
to improve absolute demand forecast accuracy, albeit only marginally so, they also tend to 
introduce bias into the forecast (Fildes et al 2009).  Demand forecasting is thus an important 
human judgment problem with significant implications for organizational performance. 
Paradoxically, despite the supposition that accounting plays an important role in facilitating 
decision-making (Demski and Feltham 1976), there is dearth of research examining the role 
that demand forecast judgments play in organizational planning and coordination (Selto and 
Widener 2004; Hansen et al. 2003; Hansen and Van der Stede 2004). In this study, we 
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examine within a manufacturing setting the effects of demand forecast disaggregation on the 
unintentional error and intentional bias in demand forecast judgments of sales managers.  
An aggregate demand forecast is one that captures total expected sales from all 
sources of demand for that product, including recurring and relatively predictable sales to 
regular customers and sales likely to be generated from uncontrollable events such as 
competitor actions or economic conditions. The task of aggregating multiple sources of 
demand each with its own distributional properties – that is, expected value and uncertainty 
around that expected value – is a cognitively challenging task (Fildes et al. 2009), resulting in 
unintentional forecast error and bias. Moreover, in many settings, self-interested sales 
managers have incentives to generate positively biased demand forecasts (i.e., with an 
asymmetrical tendency toward positive errors) to influence operational decisions with the 
objective of ensuring adequate resources for the specific products and services they anticipate 
selling. The lack of transparency in an aggregate demand forecast provides sales managers 
increased opportunity to introduce opportunistic positive bias as a means of influencing 
production decisions in their favor (c.f., Abdel-Rahim et al. 2018).  
We propose that disaggregating a unit-level demand forecast into separate forecasts 
for individual sources of demand provides one avenue for improving forecast accuracy and 
mitigating managerial opportunism. We first hypothesize that a disaggregated forecast system 
will result in lower absolute error in sales managers’ demand forecast judgments because the 
process of producing a disaggregated forecast improves the completeness and effectiveness 
of sales managers’ information processing and lessens the cognitive demands of the forecast 
judgment (Raiffa 1968; Henrion et al. 1993; Ravinder et al. 1988). Moreover, we predict that 
the increased transparency of disaggregated demand forecast information will discipline sales 
managers and reduce opportunistic positive forecast bias. If production planners (the users of 
the demand forecast) can observe the forecasts for the separate sources of demand, sales 
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managers (the providers of the demand forecast) will rein in their tendencies to engage in 
opportunistic forecast biasing as a means of influencing production decisions.  
Our research setting is a large multinational agricultural chemical manufacturing 
organization. During our period of study, our research site introduced a disaggregated 
demand forecast system. This system required sales managers to disaggregate the aggregate 
demand forecast into two parts: (i) a forecast of expected sales from demand sources not (or 
no longer) contingent on external events, and (ii) separate forecasts of expected sales for each 
identified source of “contingent” demand; that is, demand that is contingent on external 
events such as weather events and pest outbreaks. We gather stock-keeping-unit (SKU) level 
data on demand forecast error, finished goods inventory levels, and production plan changes 
from before and after the disaggregated forecast system introduction in order to examine the 
effect of forecast disaggregation on the behaviors of those making the demand forecasts (i.e., 
the sales managers) and on those using the forecasts (i.e., production managers).  
Consistent with the firm’s objective and with our prediction, we find that the 
implementation of the disaggregated forecast system led to a decline in absolute demand 
forecast error with a corresponding favorable (i.e., negative) effect on finished goods 
inventory levels. However, this benefit was observed only for those products that are more 
difficult to forecast owing to increased environmental and operational uncertainty and for 
which the cognitive benefits of forecast disaggregation are greatest. 
We also find that the disaggregated forecast system led to a decline in positive 
forecast bias, but only for products with sufficient production resources (i.e., for which 
incentives to bias are relatively weaker). Indeed, for products with limited production 
resources we find no reduction in positive forecast bias. We conclude that the benefits of the 
disaggregated demand forecast system arising from increased transparency are not sufficient 
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to overcome heightened incentives of self-interested sales managers risking lost sales owing 
to limited production resources.  
Given that the ultimate goal of improving forecast quality is to improve operations, 
we also predict and find a favorable (i.e., negative) direct effect of the disaggregated demand 
forecast system introduction on finished goods inventory levels incremental to the indirect 
effects on inventory through reductions in absolute forecast error and positive forecast bias. 
This decline in finished goods inventory reflects a shift from finished goods to work-in-
process inventory that was accomplished without a corresponding increase in production plan 
instability. The disaggregated demand forecast system thus effectively facilitated a 
production “postponement” strategy where the transformation of work-in-process inventory 
to finished goods inventory is delayed as long as possible. 
This study makes several important contributions to both the accounting and 
operations literatures.  The operations literature is replete with analytic and simulation studies 
of the harmful effects of demand forecast error (Boudreau et al. 2003).  Despite the 
prevalence of human judgment in the forecasting process, less than five percent of studies in 
this literature examine the behavior of individuals making forecast judgments (Fildes et al. 
2008). Even when they do examine individual forecast judgments, they rarely account for the 
organizational context, including individual incentives, within which those judgments are 
made.1 We make an important contribution to the operations literature by documenting one 
way in which human demand forecast judgments can be improved, and yet also show the 
limitations of those improvements owing to the managerial incentives induced by the 
organizational context. Thus, while operations researchers approach demand forecasting as an 
                                                          
1 One exception is Scheele et al. (2014) who test in a laboratory experiment the effects on forecast accuracy of 
an incentive scheme that penalizes forecast error.  The nascient “behavioral operations” literature has only 
begun to examine the opportunistic behaviors of self-interested managers in the context of inventory 
management and production planning (c.f., Bendoly et al. 2006; Bendoly et al. 2010; Scheele et al. 2018; 
Siemsen et al. 2018). 
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optimization problem to be solved, we approach it as a human judgment and management 
control problem to be understood and managed.  
We also contribute directly to the management accounting literature. Despite 
extensive research examining the budgeting process and claims that budgets play an 
important role in organizational planning, in most organizations periodic and detailed demand 
forecasts have supplanted the budget as the primary planning and coordination tool 
(Bittlestone 2000; CIMA 2004; Hagel 2014; Sivabalan et al. 2009; Ekholm and Wallin 2011). 
We provide one of the few examinations of the role that demand forecasts play on 
organizational planning. Interestingly, whereas accounting research provides consistent 
evidence of the tendency of managers to generate conservative budgets (i.e., build budget 
“slack”) to affect budget-based incentives, we show that demand forecasts so critical for 
coordination are actually systematically positively biased. 
Further, the accounting budgeting literature has dealt at great length with the gaming 
behavior of managers working under budget-based incentive contracts (e.g., Merchant 1985; 
Young 1985; Chow et al. 1988; Waller 1988; Chow et al., 1994; Dunk 1989, 1993; Shields 
and Shields 1998; Fisher et al., 2002). The focus of this literature is on the misalignment of 
incentives of subordinate managers (i.e., agents) opportunistically participating in the 
budgeting process at the detriment of the firm (i.e., the principal). But there are agency costs 
at every level of the organization associated with managers who must obtain the cooperation 
of each other. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 309) note,   
“… the analysis of these more general organizational issues is even more difficult than 
that of the ‘ownership and control’ issue because the nature of the contractual obligations 
and rights of the parties are much more varied and generally not as well specified in 
explicit contractual arrangements.” 
  
Our study examines the misalignment of incentives between two groups of agents, sales 
managers and production managers. Our study speaks to the more general organizational 
issues that Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify but have largely been ignored in the 
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accounting literature, and answers calls for research of the largely undocumented 
consequences for the users of (potentially inaccurate and biased) accounting information 
(Jonsson 1998; Wacker and Lummus 2002; Hall 2010).  
Lastly, our study speaks to the broader accounting literature that examines the relation 
between internal forecasting processes and management earnings forecasts generated for the 
external market. Hemmer and Labro (2008) provide analytic evidence that internal 
forecasting quality relates to external reporting quality. Survey studies show that internal 
forecasting is more “sophisticated” in settings in which meeting external earnings 
benchmarks are more important (Kroos et al. 2018) and that more sophisticated risk-based 
forecasting and planning systems are associated with more accurate earnings forecasts (Ittner 
and Michels 2017). However, Ittner and Michels (2017) lament that internal forecasting 
remains to a large extent a black box. Our study begins to open the black box of internal 
forecasting practices and delves more deeply into specific ways in which firms can improve 
internal forecast accuracy through the explicit identification and disaggregation of demand 
forecasts based on sources of demand.   
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
2.1. Human Judgment in the Demand Forecast Process  
The purpose of the demand forecast is to support an organization’s “sales and 
operations planning” (S&OP) process with forecasts that are integrated, accurate, detailed, 
and timely (Oliva and Watson 2009; Bowersox et al. 2012). The objective is to “bring 
production through in the required quantity, of the required quality, at the required time, and 
at the most reasonable cost” (Younger 1930, p. iii, as quoted in Aytug et al. 2005).  
Sales managers typically provide to production managers a single point demand 
forecast that reflects aggregate expected sales for a given product (Siemsen et al. 2018). 
While sales managers often have access to an initial baseline forecast generated from 
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statistical algorithms based on historical data (e.g., exponential smoothing), they use their 
judgment to adjust the baseline forecast based on information not reflected in historical data. 
This information may include observed and expected competitor actions, changing market 
conditions, and anticipated customer responses to the organization’s promotion activities 
(Bowersox et al. 2012; Cassar and Gibson 2008; Fildes and Goodwin 2007; Fildes et al. 
2009; Oliva and Watson 2009; Sivabalan et al. 2009; Goodwin and Fildes 2011; Scheele et 
al. 2018; Kremer et al. 2016; Siemsen et al. 2018). While prior research finds supplementing 
statistical forecasts with manager judgment can improve forecast accuracy (Fildes et al. 2009; 
Goodwin and Fildes 2011), doing so also introduces the potential for human error. 
2.2. Effects of Forecast Disaggregation on Absolute Forecast Error  
Forecasting separate components of demand is less cognitively challenging for 
individuals and can improve forecast judgments (Ravinder et al. 1988; Henrion et al. 1993; 
Webby et al. 2005). Laboratory experimental research documents lower forecast error 
(Webby et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2015) and higher inter-rater reliability among forecasters 
(Arkes et al. 2009) for disaggregated forecasts as compared to aggregated forecasts.  Note, 
however, that prior research documenting the benefits of disaggregation in demand 
forecasting examine “hierarchical disaggregation” (Kremer et al. 2016). That is, these 
(primarily experimental) studies show error in judgment forecasts is higher when the forecast 
is generated for a broader category of demand (e.g., a product category or a region) than if 
demand forecasts are generated for a narrower category (e.g., specific products or specific 
customers) first. In contrast, the method of disaggregation on which we focus is based on the 
disaggregation of different sources of demand at the same product hierarchy level.  
Forecast disaggregation beneficially affects how information is processed by 
forecasters, reducing the cognitive demands of the forecast judgment (Ravinder et al. 1988; 
Henrion et al. 1993; Chen et al. 2015). We posit that disaggregating a forecast will improve 
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absolute forecast accuracy. The process of “unpacking” the sources of demand increases their 
salience which improves knowledge retrieval (Bonner et al. 1996) and memory recall of their 
details (Tversky and Koehler 1994; Van Boven and Epley 2003). Further, the transparency 
afforded by a disaggregated forecast system increases sales manager accountability which 
prior research has shown to increase their information gathering efforts (Lerner and Tetlock 
1999). We expect this to result in forecasts that more completely reflect all available 
information (i.e., that mitigate the availability bias), including details regarding what the 
various sources of demand are and their distributional properties (i.e., expectation and 
uncertainty). The separation of demand sources will also mitigate error induced by an 
aggregation bias as managers are no longer aggregating to total demand. We expect these 
improvements in information processing to lead to a reduction in absolute forecast error 
(Raiffa 1968; Henrion et al. 1993; Ravinder et al. 1988).2 We make the following prediction: 
HYPOTHESIS 1a: Absolute demand forecast error will be lower for a disaggregated 
forecast than for an aggregated forecast, on average. 
 
As our hypothesis H1a is predicated on the cognitive benefits derived from 
disaggregation, we expect the improvement in absolute demand forecast error to be greater in 
settings in which forecasting is more difficult; that is, in settings of high environmental and 
operational uncertainty. It is in these instances that disaggregation will have the greatest 
cognitive benefits. By contrast, in more stable settings in which demand is relatively easier to 
forecast, the cognitive benefits of “unpacking” demand into its components are lower. 
Indeed, Armstrong (2001) notes that disaggregating a “low uncertainty problem increases the 
likelihood that one or more of the component estimates will have a greater uncertainty than 
the uncertainty associated with the target quantity. Should this occur, errors in estimation 
                                                          
2 One might argue that aggregation has the benefit of allowing for negatively correlated sources of demand 
information to offset, thereby reducing total error in the overall forecast (Arya and Glover 2014; Kremer et al. 
2016). While this may be true of statistical models, Kremer et al. (2016) show that when asked to produce an 
aggregate demand forecast, individuals fail to properly account for the correlations in demand that would reduce 
the total error in the aggregate forecast. 
 
 
9 
 
may not cancel each other adequately, thereby leading to a less accurate estimate than the 
holistic estimation.” However, he also cautions against concluding that disaggregation should 
be abandoned for low uncertainty forecasting problems noting the large body of research 
supporting the benefits of disaggregation. Thus, while we expect forecast disaggregation to 
result in a reduction in absolute forecast error on average, we expect the benefits of 
disaggregation, and hence the reduction in absolute forecast error, to be greater for products 
that are more difficult to forecast. Stated formally: 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: The difference in absolute demand forecast accuracy between a 
disaggregated and aggregated forecast (H1a) will be larger for more difficult-to-forecast 
products. 
 
2.3. Effects of Forecast Disaggregation on Forecast Bias 
While in hypotheses H1a and H1b we address the biases and cognitive limitations 
related to sales managers’ forecast judgments, we also recognize that forecast judgments will 
be influenced by sales managers’ incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior by positively 
biasing the forecast. Hypothesis H1a predicts that forecast disaggregation will result in 
demand forecasts that are closer to actual sales in absolute value. However, a reduction in 
absolute error magnitude, on average, neither guarantees nor precludes a decline in forecast 
bias – that is, the incidence of either positive or negative errors.  
Forecast disaggregation increases transparency of the demand forecasts for the 
naturally skeptical production managers. The richer forecast information that disaggregation 
provides allows production managers to better infer positive demand forecast bias over time 
and adjust production plans accordingly, thereby rendering any intentional positive bias 
ineffective. We argue that this serves as a disciplining mechanism for sales managers who 
want to avoid the appearance of rent-seeking, leading them to reduce any opportunistic 
positive bias. Consistent with this, Abdel-Rahim et al. (2018) show experimentally that 
participants report costs more truthfully in a disaggregated reporting condition as compared 
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to an aggregated reporting condition. They also document that experimental participants 
relying on those reports view disaggregated forecasts to be more credible and rely on those 
reports to a greater extent.3 We thus predict that demand forecast positive bias will be lower 
for a disaggregated forecast as compared to an aggregated forecast. Stated formally:   
HYPOTHESIS 2a: The incidence of positive forecast errors relative to negative forecast 
errors will be lower for a disaggregated forecast than for an aggregated forecast, on 
average. 
 
Hypothesis H2a predicts that sales managers in a disaggregated forecasting regime 
will self-discipline and forecast truthfully to gain credibility and avoid the appearance of rent-
seeking. However, we recognize that incentives to positively bias forecasts as a way to 
influence production decisions to avoid stockouts are especially strong for products 
competing for scarce production resources; for example, for products for whom production 
capacity and/or input resources are limited. We predict that by having more discipline in the 
forecasting of products, on average (as predicted in H2a), sales managers build forecast 
credibility that they then exploit to influence production decisions for products with 
constrained production resources. In this way, sales managers can “pick their battles” with 
their demand forecast bias. Thus, although we predict a decrease in the incidence of positive 
errors relative to negative errors, on average, we expect the decrease to be smaller for 
products with constrained production resources. Stated formally: 
HYPOTHESIS 2b: The difference in the incidence of positive forecast errors relative to 
negative forecast errors between a disaggregated forecast and an aggregated forecast (H2a) 
will be smaller for products with constrained production resources. 
 
2.4. Inventory Effects of Forecast Disaggregation 
Prior operations research documents a positive association between demand forecast 
error and production plan instability (e.g., Aytug et al. 2005; Bai et al. 2002; Xie et al. 2003; 
                                                          
3 The financial accounting literature also shows that disaggregated forecasts are deemed more credible than 
aggregated forecasts (e.g., Hirst et al. 2007; Dong et al. 2017). 
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Jeunet 2006; Kerkkänen et al. 2009; Pujawan and Smart 2012).4 Production instability is the 
“intensity of revisions or changes to the production schedule over time” (Pujawan and Smart 
2012) and results in significant costs associated with inventory handling, inventory 
obsolescence, labor overtime, increased materials costs, increased freight costs, increased 
record-keeping costs, quality failure costs, and lost sales (Lee and Adam 1986; Inman and 
Gonsalvez 1997; Wacker and Lummus 2002; Kerkkänen et al. 2009; Pujawan and Smart 
2012).  
Operations research identifies a number of mechanisms to reduce the negative effects 
of demand forecast error on production stability. In particular, this research examines the 
optimal level of “safety stock” (i.e., finished goods inventory held to prevent lost sales from 
stockouts) (e.g., Sridharan and LaForge 1989, 1990; Bai et al. 2002; Toktay and Wein 2001; 
Enns 2002). In determining the optimal level of inventory, the aforementioned costs of 
production instability are balanced against increased holding costs of the safety stocks 
(Sridharan and LaForge 1990). In general, higher absolute forecast error requires higher 
levels of finished goods safety stock (c.f., Aytug et al. 2005; Gunasekaran and Ngai 2005; 
and Mula et al. 2006). Hypothesis H1a thus implies that demand forecast disaggregation will 
have an indirect favorable (i.e., negative) effect on finished goods inventory levels through 
the reduction in absolute demand forecast error.  
Our last hypothesis proposes that a disaggregated forecast system will facilitate a 
production “postponement” strategy resulting in a direct effect of demand forecast 
disaggregation on inventory levels over and above the indirect association implied by H1a. 
Production postponement refers to the delay in transforming work-in-process inventory to 
SKU-level finished goods inventory as long as possible to allow for the resolution of 
                                                          
4 For reviews of this literature, see Aytug et al. (2005), Gunasekaran and Ngai (2005), Burgess et al. (2006), and 
Mula et al. (2006). 
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uncertainty (e.g., van Hoek 2001; Le Blanc et al. 2009; Garcia-Dastugue and Lambert 2007).  
An effective production postponement strategy lowers the level of finished goods inventory 
while at the same time reducing production instability derived from forecast error (Le Blanc 
et al. 2009; Boone et al. 2007; Garcia-Dastugue and Lambert 2007). We expect that 
disaggregated forecast information will facilitate a production postponement strategy by 
providing production managers the information needed to accelerate finished goods 
production for some sources of demand (i.e., the more predictable demand), while delaying 
production for other sources of demand (i.e., the less predictable demand). We thus make the 
following prediction: 
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Finished goods inventory (i.e., safety stock) will be lower for a 
disaggregated forecast than for an aggregated forecast, on average.  
 
Taken together, we predict that the cognitive benefits of disaggregating the demand 
forecasts will lead to a decrease in absolute forecast error, on average and especially for 
products more difficult to forecast. We also predict the transparency afforded by forecast 
disaggregation will reduce intentional positive forecast bias. However, forecast 
disaggregation will not overcome intense incentive-driven positive forecast bias behavior for 
the very products that an organization would like to avoid tying up in inventory; namely, 
those products in limited supply because of scarce production resources. Lastly, we predict 
both an indirect effect (through a reduction in forecast error) and a direct effect (through 
production postponement) of forecast disaggregation on finished goods inventory. 
3. Research Setting  
3.1. Research Site 
Our research site is AgroCo, a leader in the agricultural chemical industry. The 
organization is one of the three largest producers of herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides in 
the U.S. by market share. Our site is an ideal setting to analyze the role of forecast 
disaggregation in the S&OP process for at least three reasons. First, the agricultural chemical 
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industry in which AgroCo operates is characterized by high product and production process 
complexity and uncertain product life cycles (uncertain time to market/ complex patent 
structures). The nature of the production processes (i.e., the management of complex AIs 
with lengthy formulation lead times) makes production and supply chain planning 
particularly vulnerable to cost effects from demand forecast error.  
Second, the industry has significant variation in the sources of demand. These include 
not only the recurring sales from long-time customers, but also product demand driven by 
uncontrollable market conditions (i.e., competitor actions), economic conditions (i.e., 
commodity prices, tariffs), and natural forces (e.g., weather events or pest outbreaks). An 
aggregate demand forecast obscures these disparate sources of demand and increases the 
information asymmetry between sales managers and production managers.  
Third, varying incentives for self-interested behavior in the form of positive forecast 
bias arise in this setting owing to differences in the availability of production resources across 
product categories. Incentives to positively bias the forecasts to ensure adequate inventory are 
acute for products with limited production resources. Transparency regarding the sources of 
demand is thus more important. 
To inform our empirical analysis we conducted field interviews at AgroCo with 
managers from various corporate departments, including Marketing, Forecasting and Supply 
Chain Planning, and Logistics. From these interviews we learn that, as in many organizations, 
the initial static sales budget serves as the performance benchmark for sales managers; that is, 
bonuses are awarded, in part, based on the manager’s ability to beat the sales budget target 
that was set at the beginning of the year.5  
Once the sales budget is approved, the BUs assume periodic demand forecasting 
                                                          
5 Specifically, sales managers’ bonuses are based on the achievement of the BU sales budget (50%), the 
corporate sales budget (25%) and a subjective performance assessment of a qualitative nature. Although forecast 
error is a designated input into the subjective assessment, interviewees noted that its importance to the overall 
bonus is low. Importantly, incentives for demand forecast accuracy do not change during our period of study. 
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responsibility. Beginning in January of each year, monthly unit (not sales dollars) demand 
forecasts are made at the detailed product level (including package type) as captured by a 
SKU (stock-keeping unit) identifier. These forecasts are used to develop production plans – 
that is, what will be produced, at which production facility, and on what days. Hence, the 
accuracy of demand forecasts is paramount. Importantly, although the monthly unit demand 
forecasts play a key role in operational planning and coordination, they have virtually no 
direct effect on sales managers’ bonus awards. While sales managers have an incentive to 
negatively bias the annual sales budget (i.e., to build “budget slack”), their incentives are to 
positively bias the monthly demand forecasts so as to ensure adequate inventory and avoid 
lost sales from stockouts.  
3.2. The Disaggregated Demand Forecast System 
  Prior to 2008, AgroCo sales managers formulated and reported to production 
managers each month a single aggregate forecast for each product that reflected total 
expected unit sales from all sources. In January 2008 the organization introduced a 
disaggregated forecasting system. AgroCo’s stated purpose for the new disaggregated 
demand forecast system was to improve operations through increased forecast accuracy and 
to create greater transparency of the sources and nature of expected demand. Increased 
forecast accuracy and a reduction in positive forecast bias were expected to result in a 
reduction of inventory.  They also expected the increased transparency from disaggregating 
the forecast to facilitate a production postponement strategy in which final, SKU-level 
production is delayed as long as possible. 
Under the new disaggregated demand forecast system, sales managers were instructed 
to generate a separate forecast for each major source of demand. One forecast would be for 
expected sales from predictable demand sources (hereafter, “predictable demand”). 
Production managers were meant to provide for these expected unit sales, either through 
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current inventory or through new production. Examples of predictable demand are recurring 
sales from repeat customers and additional expected sales from promotions.6  
In addition to the predictable demand forecast, sales managers were to formulate a 
separate demand forecast for each identified source of demand that was contingent on 
significant external “events” (hereafter, “contingent demand” or “event-driven” demand); that 
is, each event-driven source of contingent demand was disaggregated from the predictable 
demand forecast. The contingent demand forecasts would reflect, for example, expected unit 
sales from a potential outbreak of a late season pest or a possible weather event, either of 
which, while low in probability of occurring, could have a significant effect on demand (with 
either a positive or negative effect on sales). For the contingent sources of demand, sales 
managers provided information regarding the probability of the contingent demand event 
occurring, the reason for and expected timing of that event, and the expected sign (positive or 
negative) and magnitude of the event’s effect (should it occur) on expected demand.  
Demand forecasts for contingent events deemed 90% probable are included in the 
predictable demand forecast. However, contingent demand events deemed to have 60%-90% 
probability of occurring, although not included in the predictable demand forecast and not 
incorporated into production plans, were visible to production managers in the reporting tool. 
Thus, the system improved transparency for production planners by separately revealing the 
contingent demand that had previously been obfuscated in a single point forecast: 
[with the disaggregated] forecasting project we said, “No more hiding your numbers.” 
Because [the prior forecast system] sandwiched it together and it came to you as one 
number. And in supply chain you had no idea … what was the sales number and what 
was [event-contingent demand]. So it was an effort to try to create some transparency… 
 
The transparency afforded by the contingent demand reporting tool allowed production 
managers to take preliminary steps to plan for the potential effects of the event on production 
                                                          
6 While we refer to this source of demand as “predictable,” there remains uncertainty as to the timing and 
quantity of this source of demand. 
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resource needs, for example, assessing the availability of “active ingredients” that would be 
needed. Improved production planning is considered a key benefit of the new system: 
[with the new system, the forecast is] spread out and you can see it as an event, you can 
actually stop production and not make it if it’s not going to happen. Versus when it’s all 
sandwiched together you don’t know. You are just producing and producing. 
 
Importantly, prior to the implementation of the disaggregated forecast system, sales 
managers were meant to incorporate all sources of demand into their forecast. However, the 
separate steps for doing so –namely, identifying sources of demand, assessing their likelihood 
of materializing, generating an expectation of the unit sales impact, and aggregating the 
expected values into a total forecast –were not elicited from them explicitly. While the mental 
processes employed by sales managers are unobservable to us, prior research suggests that 
the largely unstructured task of generating an aggregate demand forecast is cognitively 
challenging and the separate steps necessary to perform such a task is likely ambiguous.  
The disaggregated forecast system makes the separate steps of identifying different 
sources of expected demand and assessing their likelihood and magnitude explicit (i.e., 
allows them to “unpack” the steps of the forecast judgment).7 Further, the system reduces the 
extent of aggregation that is needed since contingent demand forecasts are kept separate in 
the system. It is this feature of the disaggregated forecast system at our research site that 
captures the process effects of demand forecast disaggregation that we aim to test and that we 
hypothesize (H1a/b) will lessen the cognitive demands of the forecast judgment on sales 
managers and mitigate unintentional biases (i.e., availability and aggregation biases). Further, 
the transparency afforded by the disaggregated forecast information generated by the system 
                                                          
7 The system was not a complete disaggregation of demand in two respects. First, the predictable demand 
forecast was, itself, an aggregate of expected (predictable or non-event driven) unit sales from multiple 
customers. Second, not all sources of contingent demand remain disaggregated as their assessed likelihood is 
also periodically updated. Once an identified contingent event becomes highly probable (i.e., 90%), the demand 
forecast for that event is added to the predictable demand forecast. Note that while the firm set guidelines on 
how to classify contingent demand events into three probability thresholds (30%, 60%, and 90%) based on the 
characteristics of the events, the estimated probability of occurrence for each identified contingent event is 
determined by the sales managers. 
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serves as the disciplining mechanism predicted to mitigate sales managers’ intentional 
biasing of demand forecasts (H2a) and to further facilitate improved inventory and 
production planning decisions (H3). Of course, the disaggregated system at our site does not 
completely remove opportunities for gaming on the part of the sales managers, a feature of 
our setting that allows us to examine hypothesis H2b (reduction in bias is lower when 
production resources are limited and incentives to bias are greatest). The disaggregated 
forecast system implementation at our research site thus provides a naturally occurring setting 
in which to examine the process and information consequences of disaggregation for the 
decision usefulness of demand forecasts, and to do so with consideration of the incentives the 
sales managers face.   
4. Data Sources and Variable Descriptions for Empirical Evidence  
4.1. Empirical strategy and data sources 
As the implementation of the disaggregated demand forecast system was initiated by 
Headquarters and implemented company-wide, we use a “One-Group Pretest-Posttest” 
experimental study design (Harris et al. 2006) to test the effect of the system implementation. 
In this design, the pre-implementation period serves as the control period. Because we lack a 
control group of products for which the system implementation did not apply, we take a 
number of measures to mitigate the effect of confounding factors. First, given that the 
treatment and control periods differ in timing, we control for time trend in three alternative 
ways (discussed in more detail in the next section). Second, we acknowledge that even with 
carefully selected control variables it is difficult to fully isolate the change in forecast error 
attributable to the system implementation. We therefore apply a design in which we compare 
forecast error changes between products for which the system implementation is expected to 
have a small impact (i.e., a quasi-control group) to those expected to be more affected by the 
system implementation (i.e., a treatment group). Any difference between the control and 
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treatment groups in the change in forecast error from before to after the system 
implementation provides evidence that the new system indeed affects the forecasting 
behavior, assuming factors other than the system implementation do not differentially affect 
the two groups. This design also provides for the tests of H1b and H2b.    
Our data are monthly data at the individual product (i.e., SKU) level for the period of 
2006-2010. We limit our analysis to the products of two specific production lines within 
AgroPlant for which data about the production process had been thoroughly and consistently 
documented over our sample period. Our data include three-month absolute forecast error 
(n.b., for confidentiality reasons, we were not given access to forecasts or actual sales), 
annual budgeted sales, finished goods inventory, and planned and actual production, all 
measured in units. In addition, we gathered data on product attributes. Our initial sample 
comprises 2,300 monthly observations of 80 unique products. In order to use a consistent 
sample across all analyses, we restrict the sample to those observations for which we have 
data on all variables, (including lagged inventory and production changes used in the test of 
H3) leaving us with 1,595 product-month observations of 67 unique products.8 Data were 
collected from two major sources. We obtained sales (related) data from the corporate sales 
department at AgroCo, including demand forecast error, sales price, and data on product 
attributes. Actual and planned production data were locally obtained at AgroPlant. Below we 
define the specific variables used in our analysis.  
4.2. Variable descriptions         
4.2.1. The Implementation of the Disaggregated Demand Forecast System. The 
disaggregated demand forecast system was introduced in the end of 2007 and 
comprehensively implemented in January 2008. We create an indicator variable for the pre- 
                                                          
8 Note that the original sample had data for every product for every time period, regardless of whether or not 
sales or production were planned. To ensure that zero forecast errors reflect actual sales that were accurately 
forecasted, we remove product-month observations with both zero budgeted sales (c.f., Fildes et al. 2009) and 
zero forecast errors. 
 
 
19 
 
and post-introduction period. We label POST as 1 in the years 2008-2010 after the 
introduction, and 0 otherwise.  
4.2.2. Demand Forecast Error Variables. The monthly product-level (i.e., SKU-
level) demand forecast error data were collected from AgroCo’s global forecast reporting 
tool.  Forecast error is defined as the absolute deviation of the actual unit sales (AS) from the 
forecasted unit sales (FS), three months out, i.e., FCSTERR = |FS-AS|/AS. We winsorize this 
variable at the 5% level. FCSTERR (signed) is the signed (i.e., not absolute value) forecast 
error which we report in the descriptive statistics. We create two variables to distinguish 
between positive and negative demand forecast error: D_POS (D_NEG) is set equal to one 
for observations indicating a positive (negative) forecast error, and zero otherwise. Further, 
we create a multilevel variable, FCSTDIR, that identifies negative (FCSTDIR < 0), zero 
(FCSTDIR = 0), and positive (FCSTDIR = 1) forecast errors.  
4.2.3. Inventory and Production Instability Variables. Beginning finished goods 
inventory level, Beg INVENTORY, is the number of months’ sales (i.e., inventory forward 
coverage based on actual subsequent sales) in finished goods inventory. Beg INVENTORY is 
measured at the end of the month prior to the month of production and thus reflects the safety 
stock on hand intended to absorb unanticipated demand. Production instability is captured by 
changes in the production plan, computed by subtracting Planned Production (PP) in units 
from Actual Production (AP), i.e., PROD_CHANGE = AP - PP.   To control for scale effects 
and determine the effect of percentage deviations of actual production from forecasted 
production, we compute ln PROD_CHANGE as the absolute logarithmic deviation of the AP 
from PP, i.e., ln PROD_CHANGE = |(log AP + 1) – (log FP + 1)|.9    
4.2.4. Product Trend Variables. One of our primary dependent variables of interest 
                                                          
9 Given the seasonality of the business and the resulting non-trivial number of observations with zero forecasted 
and/or actual production, we add one prior to computing the logarithms.  
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is absolute forecast error. A reduction in absolute forecast error could be due not only to 
better forecasts as we predict in H1a and H1b, but also to changes in actual unit sales. 
Because our primary independent variable of interest is an indicator variable capturing the 
periods before and after the disaggregated forecast system implementation, an econometric 
concern is that unit sales exhibit a systematic trend during our period of study that we 
erroneously attribute to the effect of the system implementation. A regression to the mean of 
unit sales, for example, could manifest as improved forecast accuracy despite no real 
difference in the forecasting behavior of the sales managers. As we do not have access to unit 
sales, we control for such effects using three time-series trend variables. First, we control for 
the product-specific time trend, starting with 1 in the month of product introduction (TREND) 
and, to allow for a non-linear time trend, its squared term (TREND2). Second, we control for 
the United Stated Department of Labor’s monthly Producer Price Index (PPI) which is an 
index of selling prices received by domestic producers for their output. Third, to control for 
within-year unit sales trends or seasonality we include indicator variables for months. 
4.2.5. Product Characteristic Variables. The proxies we use for forecasting 
difficulty (test of H1b) and constrained resources (test of H2b) are collected from AgroCo’s 
product rating system developed by the production planners as a means of assessing supply 
chain complexity. Each product consists of one key component that multiple products share 
called the lead “active ingredient” (AI). The measure of forecasting difficulty, 
AI_FCSTDIFF, is the organization’s own summary assessment of how hard a product is to 
forecast on a scale of 0 to 10 with larger values indicating greater forecasting difficulty. We 
use as our proxy for constrained production resources, reflecting sales managers’ incentives 
to positively bias the forecast, AgroCo’s assessment of the degree to which a product’s AI is 
in limited supply and, hence, needs to be allocated across all products sharing the AI. 
AI_ALLOCATION is measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher values indicating more 
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competition among products for a scarce AI resource and, hence, greater incentives to 
positively bias the forecast. 
We further control for two additional characteristics of AIs that make their derivative 
products more complex from a supply chain planning perspective and that may affect demand 
forecast error or inventory levels. Both of these variables are also collected from AgroCo’s 
product rating system. AI_PRODUCTS is the number of products that share a given AI. 
AI_LIFECYCLE captures the lifecycle phase for a given AI’s product portfolio. AIs with new 
products in their portfolio yield the highest scores on this variable while AIs with mature 
products yield low scores.  
We also control for five additional product characteristics that may vary across 
products and through time and that may impact forecast error or inventory levels. 
NEW_PROD is an indicator variable that identifies products that were newly introduced 
during our sample period. QUANTITY is the annual product-level budgeted sales quantity 
expressed in liters. SALES VALUE is the sales price per unit of measurement (e.g., liters, 
gallons) multiplied by the individual product pack size (e.g., 100 liters, 2.5 gallons). Gross 
margin percentage (GMPCT) is the ratio of gross margin per unit (i.e., sales price minus 
standard costs) and sales price per unit. Lastly, we control for EXPORT, an indicator variable 
to identify products sold outside the US. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
5. Empirical Results  
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample period (Panel A), and 
separately for the pre- and post-introduction periods (Panel B). In Panel C we provide 
descriptive statistics for FCSTERR separately for zero, positive, and negative errors. On 
average, the 3-month absolute forecast error (FCSTERR) is quite high (2.320, Panel A). For 
the entire sample period 56.49% of the forecast errors are positive (with mean absolute error 
 
 
22 
 
of 3.813), while only 25.27% of forecast errors are negative (with mean absolute error of 
0.659) (Panel C). Thus, the incidence of negative versus positive errors is not equally 
distributed as would be expected if only random error were at play, and the magnitudes of 
positive errors are larger than negative errors, on average.  
In the univariate test reported in Table 1, Panel B, overall absolute forecast error 
increases from before (1.946) to after (2.460) the system implementation (p<0.01). While 
there is no significant difference in the incidence of positive errors, on average, the incidence 
of zero errors increases (from 14.75% to 19.55%, p<0.05) (Panel C). Lastly, there is no 
statistically significant difference in inventory forward coverage, INVENTORY, but there is a 
significant decline in PROD_CHANGE (p<0.05), from before to after the system introduction 
(Panel B).  There are numerous differences between the pre- and post-system descriptive 
statistics for many of the product attribute variables (Table 1, Panel B), suggesting inferences 
from univariate statistics may be misleading, making a multivariate analysis necessary. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
5.2. Absolute Demand Forecast Error (H1) 
Hypothesis H1a examines the effect of demand forecast disaggregation on absolute 
demand forecast error, controlling for changing product characteristics and time trends. We 
test this hypothesis by estimating the following OLS regression model: 
FCSTERR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (1) 
 
where FCSTERR is absolute forecast error and POST is an indicator variable set equal to zero 
(one) for all observations prior (subsequent) to the implementation of the disaggregated 
forecast system. Standard errors are clustered at the product level. H1a predicts 1 < 0. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
We first estimate a reference model of FCSTERR against all the control variables 
using the subsample of observations prior to the implementation of the disaggregated demand 
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forecasting system (N = 434). The results are presented in Table 2, Model 1 and show that 
absolute forecast error is lower for higher margin products (GMPCT coefficient of -1.839, 
p<0.01, two-tailed) and higher for products with larger sales value (SALES VALUE 
coefficient of 18.927, p<0.01, two-tailed). There is evidence of an upward trend in absolute 
forecast error as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on TREND (0.194, 
p<0.10, two-tailed). The coefficients on AI_FCSTDIFF and AI_ALLOCATION are not 
statistically significant (p>0.10, two-tailed).  
Model 2 provides our test of H1a with the estimation of equation (1). Inconsistent 
with H1a, we do not find that, on average, absolute demand forecast error is lower after the 
implementation of the disaggregated demand forecast system as indicated by a negative, but 
insignificant coefficient on POST (coefficient of -0.225, p>0.10, two-tailed).  
As a next step, we examine whether the effect of the system implementation is greater 
for products that are more difficult to forecast (H1b). In particular, in Model 3 we introduce 
an interaction between POST and our forecasting difficulty proxy AI_FCSTDIFF: 
FCSTERR = 0 + 1 POST + 2 POST * AI_FCSTDIFF + <controls> (2) 
 
Hypothesis H1b predicts 2 < 0 indicating that the improvement in forecast error following 
the system implementation is more pronounced for products identified as being more difficult 
to forecast. Consistent with H1b, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
the POST * AI_FCSTDIFF interaction term (coefficient of -0.091, p<0.05, one-tailed), 
indicating that forecast error decreases significantly more for products deemed by the 
organization to be more difficult to forecast. This is consistent with the disaggregated system 
lessening the cognitive demands of the forecasting judgment, at least for products for which 
the cognitive demands are particularly heavy.10  
                                                          
10 While AgroCo generates forecasts for various time horizons (i.e., 9, 6, 3, and 1 month prior to the month of 
sales), we examine the 3-month forecast horizon to mitigate the possibility that our results reflect a mechanical 
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As an alternative test for H1b and to facilitate the assessment of effect sizes, we 
estimate Equation (1) separately for two subsamples of observations, those with below-mean 
(Model 4) and those with above-mean (Model 5) values of AI_FCSTDIFF. We find no effect 
of the system implementation in the low forecasting difficulty sample (Model 4 POST 
coefficient of 0.487, p>0.10, one-tailed). By contrast, we find a significant decline in absolute 
forecast error for the high forecasting difficulty subsample (Model 5 POST coefficient of -
1.224, p<0.05, one-tailed). For these products the mean absolute demand forecast error 
declines from their pre-implementation level of 2.3 (untabulated) to 1.1 (i.e., a 47% 
reduction) after the system implementation. The difference in the coefficients on POST 
between the subsamples is statistically significant (p<0.05, two-tailed). We conclude from 
our results that, controlling for product attributes, seasonality, and time trends, the 
implementation of the disaggregated forecast system resulted in a decline in forecast error 
only for those products that are more difficult to forecast.  
5.3. Positive vs. Negative Demand Forecast Errors (H2) 
H2a predicts an on average decrease in the incidence of positive forecast errors 
relative to negative forecast errors following the introduction of the disaggregated forecast 
system.  We test H2a by estimating the following equation using a multinomial logistic 
model (with standard errors clustered at the product level): 
FCSTDIR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (3) 
 
where FCSTDIR is a multilevel variable that takes the values of -1 for negative forecast 
errors (i.e., under-forecasting of demand), 0 for zero forecast errors, and +1 for positive 
                                                          
effect of removing demand from events that are unlikely to occur (e.g., low probability “events”). At the 3-
month forecast horizon, our field interviewees indicate that most events have resolved; that is, they have either 
been “triggered” and added to the predictable demand forecast, or have essentially expired. This suggests that 
both before and after the system implementation, the 3-month forecast will reflect roughly the same categories 
of demand information. We thus conclude that any improvement in 3-month forecast accuracy derives, at least 
in part, from the cognitive benefits of the disaggregation process. Our finding of cross-sectional variation in the 
results based on forecast difficulty further support our conclusion; we would not expect to observe this cross-
sectional variation if the primary result was mechanically induced. 
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forecast errors (i.e., over-forecasting). Results are reported in Table 3, Panel A. Model 1 
presents a controls-only model for the pre-system implementation period as a reference. 
Model 2 provides the test of H2a. Results are reported for three comparisons: negative errors 
versus zero errors, positive versus zero errors, and positive versus negative errors.  
Hypothesis H2a predicts a pre- to post-implementation decline in the incidence of 
positive forecast errors relative to negative errors and is tested with the estimation of equation 
(3). Results are presented in the three columns of Model 2 in Table 3, Panel A. The negative 
coefficients on POST for negative versus zero error in column 1 (-1.002, p<0.05) and for 
positive versus zero error in column 2 (-1.248, p<0.01) in Model 2 indicate that the likelihood 
of forecast error (in either direction) declines following the implementation of the 
disaggregated forecast system. However, in Model 2 there is a statistically insignificant 
coefficient on POST in the third column of Model 2 (coefficient of -0.246, p>0.10, one-
tailed). Thus, contrary to H2a there is no on average reduction in the incidence of positive 
forecast errors relative to negative forecast errors following the system implementation.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Following the same approach as in our tests for H1, we next test for a product-level 
difference in difference in the incidences of positive relative to negative forecast errors from 
before to after the system introduction. We test H2b by estimating the following equation: 
FCSTDIR = 0 + 1 POST + 2POST * AI_ALLOCATION + <controls> (4)
  
H2b predicts 2 > 0. Results comparing the incidence of positive vs. negative errors 
are presented in Table 3, Panel A, Model 3. In this model specification, we find a significant 
decline in forecast positive bias as indicated by the negative coefficient on POST (-0.932, 
p<0.05, one-tailed). Thus, for products that are produced from AIs in plentiful supply (i.e., 
those with AI_ALLOCATION = 0, 17% of the sample), the system results in a significant 
reduction in positive forecast bias. However, consistent with H2b, we find a positive and 
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significant coefficient on the POST * AI_ALLOCATION interaction term (coefficient of 
0.094, p<0.05, one-tailed), indicating that positive forecast bias declines less for products 
with scarcer AI resources.  
As an alternative test for H2b and to facilitate interpretation of effect sizes, we 
estimate equation (3) separately for the subsamples of observations with below-mean and 
above-mean values of AI_ALLOCATION.  The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. We 
find a significant reduction in the incidence of positive versus negative forecast errors for 
products whose production is not significantly constrained by scarce AI resources, that is, 
those with low values of AI_ALLOCATION (POST coefficient in Model 1 of -1.034, p<0.01, 
one-tailed). The associated log odds of 0.36 (e-1.034) suggests an economically significant 
reduction in positive forecast bias (i.e., .36 times as likely to have a positive vs. negative 
error) for these products. However, the coefficient on POST is insignificant in the high 
AI_ALLOCATION model (coefficient of -0.026, p>0.10, one-tailed). The difference in the 
coefficients is also statistically significant (p<0.05, two-tailed). Thus, consistent with H2b, a 
reduction in positive forecast bias from the system implementation is not observed for those 
products for which production resources are constrained and where incentives to positively 
bias are relatively strong. Overall, our results confirm that forecast disaggregation resulted in 
the intended decrease in positive bias only for products not constrained by scarce AI 
resources, but not for products whose AI is “on allocation” – exactly those products for which 
positive forecast bias is most costly.  
While our focus in H2a and H2b is on intentional demand forecast positive bias, 
positive forecast errors can also result from unintentional “optimism bias” (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Weinstein 1980) on the part of sales managers.11 However, prior research 
                                                          
11 Optimism bias is when individuals overlook large unfavorable outliers and assume a higher likelihood of best 
case scenarios in their expectations. Optimism bias has been documented in a variety of forecasting settings, 
including analyst forecasts (e.g., Young 2009; Clatworthy et al. 2012; Jiang et al. 2016), management earnings 
forecasts (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2007), and supply chain demand planning (Fildes et al. 2009). 
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provides no clear prediction regarding whether an optimism bias will manifest to a greater or 
lesser extent for a disaggregated as compared to an aggregated forecast task. On the one 
hand, Chen et al. (2015) provide experimental evidence that disaggregation leads to an 
increase in forecast optimism (inconsistent with our findings in support of H2a). Based on 
motivated reasoning arguments (Kunda 1990), they find that individuals with performance 
incentives who are asked to provide a disaggregated forecast increase bias in their forecast 
“in a direction consistent with their directional preferences.” On the other hand, individuals 
are more likely to exhibit optimism for difficult tasks (e.g., Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977). 
If disaggregation lessens the cognitive demands of the forecast judgment, optimism might 
decline (consistent with our finding).  
Our evidence in support of H2b (i.e., smaller reduction in positive bias for resource 
constrained products), however, supports our inference that at least part of the reduction in 
forecast bias we document (H1a) is incentive driven and, hence, reflective of opportunistic 
forecast bias instead of unintentional optimism. That is, we would not expect unintentional 
optimism bias to be affected by incentives. Further, field evidence confirms that for resource 
constrained products incentives and opportunities to upward bias the demand forecast remain 
after the introduction of the disaggregated demand forecast system. Specifically, in our 
interviews sales managers describe their strategy of inflating the demand forecast in order to 
ensure availability of products that are resource constrained: 
Do we need to put all of the volume that we think we’re going to need into the 
[predictable component of the demand forecast] because otherwise we will not get the AI, 
we won’t be able to go to global and argue for the AI unless we put it in the [predictable 
component of the demand forecast].  
 
Thus, although we conclude that forecast disaggregation provides transparency that 
can mitigate opportunistic positive forecast bias, we also acknowledge that a reduction in 
unintentional optimism bias may partly explain our findings.   
5.4. Inventory (H3) 
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Hypothesis H3 examines the impact of the system implementation on finished goods 
inventory measured at the beginning of the month. Specifically, H3 predicts a direct negative 
effect of demand forecast disaggregation on beginning finished goods inventory, incremental 
to the indirect effect on inventory from reductions in forecast error and positive bias. For our 
analysis of inventory effects we estimate the following equations using an OLS estimation 
with standard errors clustered at the product level and report the results in Table 412: 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 POST + 2 FCSTERR + <controls> (5) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 POST + 2 FCSTERR * D_NEG  (6) 
 + 3 FCSTERR * D_POS + <controls>  
 
The first two models in Panel A of Table 4, without the POST direct effect, provide 
insight into the indirect effects of the system implementation on inventory. As would be 
expected, the coefficient on FCSTERR in Model 1 is positive and significant (coefficient of 
0.207, p<0.01, two-tailed), indicating that higher expected absolute forecast error is 
associated with higher finished goods inventory safety stock, on average. Recall that previous 
results show a decrease in overall absolute forecast error for more difficult-to-forecast 
products (H1b). We can infer from Model 1 that the system implementation had an indirect 
favorable effect (i.e., a decline) on finished goods beginning inventory for these types of 
products; that is, by reducing absolute forecast error the system allows the firm to lower their 
finished goods safety stock as they had intended. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Table 4, Panel A, Model 2 shows that the association between FCSTERR and Beg 
Inventory in Model 1 is driven by positive forecast errors; that is the coefficient on FCSTERR 
* D_POS is positive and significant (0.190, p<0.01, one-tailed) while the coefficient on 
FCSTERR * D_NEG is insignificant. Recall previous results that show a reduction in the 
                                                          
12 The forecast error used in our test, while computed based on realizations, is a proxy for the expected error in 
the forecast at the time the inventory decisions are made. That is, we are modeling the association between 
beginning finished goods inventory (i.e., safety stock) and expected (i.e., one-month ahead) forecast error.   
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incidence of positive errors for products not constrained by scarce AI resources. From Model 
2 we can infer an indirect favorable effect on inventory levels (i.e., a decline) for those 
products as well. Taken together with earlier results, we conclude that the system 
implementation resulted in the intended reduction in inventory levels, at least for some 
products, indirectly through reductions in absolute forecast error and positive forecast bias.  
Hypothesis H3 predicts a direct effect of the system implementation on finished 
goods inventory levels incremental to the indirect effects through changes in forecast error; 
that is, 1 < 0 in equations (5) and (6). Results are presented in Table 4, Model 3 and 4, 
respectively. Consistent with hypothesis H3, we find significant negative coefficients on 
POST in both Model 3 (-4.148, p<0.05, one-tailed) and Model 4 (-4.113, p>0.05, one-tailed). 
Thus, controlling for the indirect effect (through forecast error and forecast positive bias) of 
the system implementation on inventory, the system implementation is associated with a 
decrease in finished goods inventory amounting to 4.1 months’ sales of inventory. Our results 
therefore support hypothesis H3.  
Next we provide two supplemental analyses in support of our conjecture that the 
implementation of the disaggregated forecast system facilitated a postponement production 
strategy. First, a successful postponement production strategy means the scheduling of 
finished goods production is delayed, resulting in a shift in average inventory levels from 
finished goods inventory to work-in-process inventory. Given that work-in-process inventory 
cannot be directly linked to the finished goods on an individual product level due to shared 
ingredients across products, we aggregate all work-in-progress and finished goods inventory 
on a monthly basis, resulting in 60 observations. We calculate the ratio of work-in-process to 
finished goods inventory per month, and then compare the average ratio of the pre-
implementation period (1.14 based on 24 observations) with the post-implementation period 
(1.37 based on 36 observations). The difference is significant at the 1% level. Thus, the 
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system facilitated a delay in the production of finished goods inventory. 
Second, another consequence of a successful production postponement strategy is that 
finished goods inventory will be lower, without an increase in production instability. To 
analyze the effect of the system implementation on production changes we estimate the 
following equations using an OLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the product 
level and report the results in Table 4, Panel B.   
Ln PROD_CHANGE = 0 + 1 Beg INVENTORY + <controls> (7) 
Ln PROD_CHANGE = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (8) 
Ln PROD_CHANGE = 0 + 1 POST + 2 Beg INVENTORY + <controls>  (9) 
 
The negative coefficient on Beg INVENTORY (coefficient of -0.030, p<0.01, two-
tailed) in Model 1 in Table 4, Panel B confirms the expectation that a higher level of finished 
goods inventory, on average, decreases the need for production changes. Thus, given that we 
have established that inventory decreased after the system introduction in our test of H3, one 
might expect a corresponding increase in production changes as well. However, a successful 
postponement strategy results in no such increase in production plan changes, despite the 
lower levels of finished goods inventory. In Model 2 and 3 we analyze whether production 
changes are affected by the system introduction. With or without controlling for Beg 
INVENTORY, we observe no increase in production instability after the system introduction. 
Overall our results provide evidence that the system implementation allowed the firm to 
successfully implement a postponement strategy, that is, achieving a decrease in inventory 
without a corresponding increase in production instability.  Improved and more transparent 
forecast information thus improves production managers’ decisions, allowing them to delay 
final production as long as possible in order to better respond to unexpected changes in the 
demand for final products.  
5.5. Robustness tests 
To exploit the panel structure of our data and more completely control for time-
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invariant product characteristics, we also estimated product-level fixed effects models. The 
results reported in Table 5, Panel A for absolute forecast error (H1a and H1b, Models 1-3), 
the incidence of positive versus negative errors (H2a and H2b, Models 4-6), inventory (Panel 
B) and production instability (Panel C) show that the signs, significance, and magnitudes of 
the coefficients on our variables of interest using a fixed effects specification are comparable 
to those in our main results. The only noteworthy difference is that the fixed effects 
estimation yields a negative and significant main effect of POST on the incidence of positive 
versus negative bias, indicating an on average decrease in positive forecast bias in support of 
H2a (coefficient of -0.829, p<0.01, one-tailed, Panel A, Model 4).  
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
Lastly, we test whether the documented H1b moderating effect, POST 
*AI_FCSTDIFF, in predicting absolute forecast error (FCSTERR, Table 2, Model 3) holds 
when also including a moderating effect for POST*AI_ALLOCATION. Similarly, we test 
whether the H2b moderating effect, POST*AI_ALLOCATION, in predicting the incidence of 
positive forecast errors (FCSTDIR, Table 3, Panel A, Model 3) holds when also including a 
moderating effect for POST * AI_FCSTDIFF. Untabulated results show that the results for 
H1b and H2b hold even when controlling for both interactions. Importantly, we do not find a 
significant interaction effect of POST and AI_ALLOCATION on absolute forecast error. This 
is to be expected because there is no reason to expect the cognitive benefits of forecast 
disaggregation to differ depending on resource-driven incentives. However, we do find a 
significant negative interaction between POST and AI_FCSTDIFF on the incidence of 
positive versus negative forecast errors; that is, there is a greater reduction in positive bias for 
more difficult-to-forecast products. Recall that our theory underlying H2a is that the decrease 
in positive bias is driven by increased transparency provided by the new forecasting system. 
Our results are consistent with the benefits of increased transparency being larger for more 
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difficult-to-forecast products, the very products for which information asymmetry between 
sales and production managers is greatest, and hence the effect of increased transparency is 
also greatest. Overall, these results not only confirm the robustness of our results, but also 
provide further substance to our underlying theoretical arguments.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we use field and archival methods to examine the effects of demand 
forecast disaggregation on forecast error, forecast bias, inventory, and production planning 
within a large manufacturing organization. Under the former forecasting regime, sales 
managers provided one point estimate demand forecast for each product that reflected all 
potential demand sources. In the newly implemented disaggregated demand forecast system 
sales managers separately report demand forecasts for different sources of demand.  
We document that, on average, forecast disaggregation improves operational 
performance in the form of lower absolute demand forecast error and finished goods 
inventory levels for products that are relatively more difficult to forecast. However, we find 
that positive forecast bias (i.e., the incidence of positive vs. negative forecast errors) declined 
only for products with relatively unconstrained production resources for which incentives to 
positively bias the forecast are relatively lower. For those products for which incentives to 
positively bias the forecast are relatively higher (i.e., those with production resources in 
scarce supply) previous levels of positive forecast bias remained. Thus, while the 
disaggregated demand forecast system reduced absolute demand forecast error and inventory 
levels for many products, these benefits were not observed for those products for which 
forecast error and bias are most detrimental; namely products with production resources in 
high global demand but limited supply. We interpret our results as providing evidence that 
forecast disaggregation lessens the cognitive demands of demand forecasting in uncertain 
environments and provides valuable transparency that can, at least in some cases, discipline 
 
 
33 
 
sales managers into reducing opportunistic positive bias.  
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, we do not have direct measures of 
specific sales managers’ incentives nor can we identify individual effects on demand forecast 
accuracy and bias. Nevertheless, we derive insights on the incentive system based on our 
field interviews which allowed us to identify an important proxy for incentive effects (i.e., the 
scarcity of production resources). Second, the limited time series of our data (i.e., only five 
years) precludes us from investigating longer-term ramifications of the disaggregated demand 
forecasting system.  We cannot, for example, fully examine how the effects of positive bias 
on production decisions may change over time owing to reputation effects. Finally, although 
we provide evidence that is consistent with our theory and inconsistent with other 
unintentional biases, we acknowledge that in our field setting we cannot fully rule out that 
our results are at least to some extent affected by common unintentional behaviors owing to, 
for example, optimism bias or the Hawthorne effect.  
Importantly, our study adds to the accounting literature and combines insights from 
the accounting and the operations research literature. In the recent development of the 
“behavioral forecasting” stream of research in the operations literature, researchers have 
begun to consider the possibility of gaming behavior in forecasting and planning. Scheele et 
al. (2018), for example, conduct an experimental study that examines how incentives might 
be used to mitigate gaming behavior on the part of sales managers. Their conclusion is that 
sales managers should be compensated for forecast accuracy, but in an asymmetrical way, 
with positive forecast errors more heavily penalized than negative forecast errors. While this 
solution may be optimal in a laboratory environment, it is uncommon in practice, likely 
because it results in the loss of high-powered incentives achieved through the use of strong 
sales levels incentives and the potential misallocation of effort away from generating sales 
and towards better forecasting. We, by contrast, study a method for improving demand 
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forecasting by altering the way in which forecasts are formulated and reported. Further, 
whereas the operations research literature has only begun to explore gaming behavior in 
organizational planning processes, the accounting literature emphasizes its pervasive 
existence, but has so far focused almost exclusively on the setting of annual budgets.  By 
contrast, we focus on unit demand forecasting and its consequences for operational decisions.   
We believe the findings we document related to the benefits of demand forecast 
disaggregation based on sources of demand generalize to any setting – including 
manufacturing, retail/wholesale, and service settings – with volatile demand and significant 
information asymmetry between sales and operations managers owing to sales managers’ 
private information. Demand uncertainty and volatility is common to many industries (Fisher, 
1994), including semiconductor, consumer electronics, and pharmaceutical industries (Wu et 
al., 2005). Further, most of these organizations have limited operational resources which 
provide strong implicit incentives for biased demand forecasts. Our findings thus provide 
generalizable insight into how demand forecasting might be structured to improve the 
coordination between sales and operations. 
Lastly, we have no evidence regarding the pervasiveness of disaggregated demand 
forecasting because broad-scale evidence of detailed forecasting practices is lacking. It may 
be that forecast disaggregation of the form we study is novel. Rather than being a limitation, 
we view this as an advantage of our study in that it provides the unique opportunity for 
accounting research findings to lead practice. Indeed, accounting research has been 
extensively criticized for not providing practically relevant research and for failing to 
advance practice (Merchant and Van der Stede 2006; Krishnan 2015; Shields 2015). How 
better to potentially move practice forward than to provide evidence regarding a practice with 
the potential to improve operational performance at others?  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 1,595) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max 
FCSTERR (absolute) 2.320 3.484 0.000 1.000 12.650 
FCSTERR (signed) 1.987 3.685 -1.000 0.445 12.650 
D_NEG 0.253 0.435 0 0 1 
D_POS 0.565 0.496 0 1 1 
Beg INVENTORY 8.407 8.427 0 6 34 
PROD_CHANGE 3,348.175 22,000.04 0 0 542,000 
AI_PRODUCTS 6.629 1.636 2 6 10 
AI_LIFECYCLE 7.916 2.858 4 10 10 
AI_FCSTDIFF 4.885 4.007 1 2 10 
AI_ALLOCATION 6.934 3.791 0 10 10 
NEW_PROD 0.522 0.500 0 1 1 
GMPCT [omitted for confidentiality] 
SALES VALUE [omitted for confidentiality] 
QUANTITY (1,000s) [omitted for confidentiality] 
PPI 172.900 6.657 158.700 173.500 183.900 
EXPORT 0.076 0.265 0 0 1 
TREND 22.000 15.330 2 19 60 
 
Panel B: Pre- versus Post-introduction Period 
  
Pre-introduction Period 
  
Post-introduction 
Period 
   
(POST = 0) (POST = 1)    
N = 434 N =1,161  Difference 
Pre- to Post- Variable  Mean SD  Mean SD  
FCSTERR (absolute) 1.946 2.974  2.460 3.648  0.514 *** 
FCSTERR (signed) 1.515 3.216  2.163 3.832  0.648 *** 
D_NEG 0.316 0.465  0.229 0.420  -0.087 *** 
D_POS 0.537 0.499  0.575 0.495  0.038  
Beg INVENTORY 8.238 7.762  8.471 8.665  0.233  
PROD_CHANGE 5,444.7 35,272.98  2,564.46 14,085.54  -2,880.24 ** 
AI_PRODUCTS 6.514 1.201  6.672 1.770  0.158 ** 
AI_LIFECYCLE 7.816 2.890  7.953 2.846  0.137  
AI_FCSTDIFF 4.429 3.972  5.055 4.008  0.626 *** 
AI_ALLOCATION 7.442 3.486  6.744 3.883  -0.698 *** 
NEW_PROD 0.244 0.430  0.626 0.484  0.382 *** 
GMPCT [omitted for confidentiality]   *** 
SALES VALUE [omitted for confidentiality]   *** 
QUANTITY (1,000s) [omitted for confidentiality]   *** 
PPI 164.500 3.990  176.100 4.323  11.600 *** 
EXPORT 0.018 0.135  0.097 0.297  0.079 *** 
TREND 11.260 6.628  26.020 15.720  14.760 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Panel C: Forecast Errors by Category, Pre- versus Post-introduction Period 
 
 
Full  
Sample 
 Pre-introduction 
Period 
 
Post-introduction 
Period 
  
 
    (POST = 0)  (POST = 1)  Difference 
Pre- to Post- Variable  Mean SD  Mean SD 
 
Mean SD  
FCSTERR (full sample)) 
N = 1,595 
100% 
 N = 434 
100% 
 
N = 1,161 
100% 
  
Absolute error 2.320 3.484  1.946 2.974  2.460 3.648  0.514*** 
           
FCSTERR (zero errors) 
N = 291 
18.24% 
 N = 64 
14.75% 
 N = 227 
19.55% 
  
4.81%** 
Absolute error 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
           
FCSTERR (negative errors) 
N = 403 
25.27% 
 N = 137 
31.57% 
 
N = 266 
22.91% 
 
 
-8.66%*** 
Absolute error 0.659 0.355  0.682 0.341  0.648 0.362  -0.034 
           
FCSTERR (positive errors) 
N = 901 
56.49% 
 N = 233 
53.69% 
 
N = 668 
57.54% 
 
 
3.85% 
Absolute error 3.813 4.030  3.224 3.580  4.018 4.159  0.794*** 
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Table 2  Test of Hypotheses H1a and H1b: Absolute Forecast Error  
 
  DV: FCSTERR 
      AI_FCSTDIFF Subsample Analysis 
 Variables 
Pred. 
sign 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) 
 
Model (3) 
 
 
Model (4) 
Low Diff 
Model (5) 
High Diff 
Difference 
Low vs. High 
POST H1a (-)  -0.225 0.167  0.487 -1.224**  
* AI_ FCSTDIFF H1b (-)   -0.091**    -0.737** 
         
AI_FCSTDIFF  0.049 -0.000 0.067     
AI_ALLOCATION  -0.021 -0.030 -0.025     
GMPCT  -1.839*** -0.011 -0.015  -0.244 0.034  
SALES VALUE  18.927*** 0.059 0.039  2.092** -0.878  
QUANTITY (1,000s)  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000  
PPI  -0.192* 0.011 0.010  -0.035 0.065  
Month Indicators  yes yes yes  yes yes  
TREND  0.194* 0.030** 0.029**  0.023 0.017  
TREND2  0.003 -0.000 -0.000  0.043** -0.001  
AI_PRODUCTS  0.130 -0.157* -0.153*  -0.184 -0.154  
AI_LIFECYCLE  0.072** 0.023 0.020  0.000 -0.155  
NEW_PROD  1.171 0.308 0.267  0.237 0.313  
EXPORT  0.558 0.816 0.818  1.049 1.176  
Constant  34.702* 0.731 0.629  8.898* -86.894  
         
R-squared  0.177 0.042 0.044  0.064 0.059  
N  434 1,595 1,595  888 707  
N-Clusters  28 67 67  30 37  
Notes: Results of the estimations of the following equations using OLS estimation: 
FCSTERR = 0 + <controls> (Model 1, subsample of observations prior to the system implementation) 
FCSTERR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (Models 2, 4, 5) 
FCSTERR = 0 + 1 POST + 2 POST * AI_ FCSTDIFF + <controls> (Model 3) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors clustered 
at the product level. 
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Table 3  Test of Hypotheses H2a-H2b: Positive versus Negative Forecast Errors 
 
Panel A: Test of Forecast Error Direction Using AI_ALLOCATION Interaction Term 
 
  DV: FCSTDIR 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Variables 
Pred. 
sign 
neg vs. 
zero 
pos vs.  
zero 
pos vs.  
neg 
 
neg vs. 
zero 
pos vs.  
zero 
pos vs. 
neg 
 
pos vs.  
neg 
POST H2a(-)     -1.002** -1.248*** -0.246  -0.932** 
* AI_ALLOCATION H2b(+)         0.094** 
           
AI_FCSTDIFF  0.114 0.188* 0.074  0.017 -0.009 -0.026  -0.033 
AI_ALLOCATION  0.328*** 0.333*** 0.005  0.135*** 0.159*** 0.024  -0.045 
GMPCT  -1.384 -1.992 -0.608  -0.055 -0.017 0.038  0.041 
SALES VALUE  5.278 12.458 7.180**  -0.724 -0.905 -0.181  -0.245 
QUANTITY (1,000s)  0.012 0.015 0.003***  0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001***  0.001*** 
PPI  0.013 -0.005 -0.018  -0.045* -0.006 0.039*  0.040* 
Month Indicators  yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes 
TREND  -0.279 -0.036 0.244**  0.038*** 0.046*** 0.008  0.007 
TREND2  -0.009 -0.002 0.007  0.000 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
AI_PRODUCTS  0.474 0.306 -0.168*  -0.048 -0.174 -0.126**  -0.136** 
AI_LIFECYCLE  -0.293* -0.147 0.146**  -0.196** -0.114 0.082***  0.085*** 
NEW_PROD  -0.281 0.188 0.468  0.994** 1.126** 0.132  0.152 
EXPORT  -0.607 -1.644 -1.037  0.100 0.161 0.061  0.061 
Constant  -4.912 -0.592 4.320  8.982** 2.746 -6.236*  -5.695 
           
Pseudo R-squared  0.216 0.216 0.216  0.107 0.107 0.107  0.111 
N  434 434 434  1,595 1,595 1,595  1,595 
N-Clusters  28 28 28  67 67 67  67 
Notes: Coefficient estimation results of the following equations using multinomial logistic regression: 
FCSTDIR = 0 + <controls> (Model 1, subsample of observations prior to the system implementation) 
FCSTDIR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (Model 2) 
FCSTDIR = 0 + 1 POST + 2 POST * AI_ALLOCATION + <controls> (Model 3) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the product 
level.
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Panel B: Test of Forecast Error Direction Using AI_ALLOCATION Subsamples  
 
  DV: FCSTDIR 
  AI_ALLOCATION Subsample Analysis 
  
Pred. 
sign 
Model (1)  Model (2)  Difference 
Unconstrained 
vs. Constrained 
Variables 
Unconstrained 
Resources 
Constrained 
Resources 
POST - -1.034*** -0.026  
 H2b(+)   1.008** 
GMPCT  -0.096 0.006  
SALES VALUE  0.362 0.163  
QUANTITY (1,000s)  0.001*** 0.003*  
PPI  0.048 0.019  
Month indicators  yes yes  
TREND  0.001 0.028**  
TREND2  -0.001 -0.000  
AI_PRODUCTS  -0.329** -0.105  
AI_LIFECYCLE  0.041 0.059  
NEW_PROD  0.036 0.324  
EXPORT  1.456** -0.918***  
Constant  -6.078 -2.506  
     
Pseudo R-squared  0.153 0.149  
N  709 886  
N-Clusters  35 32  
Notes: Coefficient estimation results of the following equation using multinomial logistic regression: 
FCSTDIR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls>   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Indicated p-values are two-tailed. Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table 4  Postponement Strategy 
PANEL A: Test of Hypothesis H3: Beginning Inventory   
 
Pred. 
sign 
DV: Beg INVENTORY 
 Without direct effect  With direct effect 
 Variables Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) 
POST H3(-)    -4.148** -4.113** 
       
FCSTERR  + 0.207***   0.202***  
FCSTERR * D_NEG -  -0.764   -0.669 
FCSTERR * D_POS +  0.190***   0.187*** 
       
AI_FCASTDIFF  0.279* 0.281*  0.261 0.263* 
AI_ALLOCATION  0.028 0.028  -0.001 -0.001 
GMPCT  -0.386** -0.391**  -0.349** -0.354** 
SALES VALUE  -1.414 -1.397  -0.713 -0.703 
QUANTITY (1,000s)  -0.003*** -0.003***  -0.003** -0.003*** 
PPI  -0.061 -0.068  0.095 0.087 
Month indicators  yes yes  yes yes 
TREND  0.125** 0.125**  0.166*** 0.166*** 
TREND2  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AI_PRODUCTS  0.735 0.745  0.771 0.779 
AI_LIFECYCLE  -0.174 -0.185  -0.167 -0.177 
NEW_PROD  1.547 1.571  2.622 2.635 
EXPORT  -4.745*** -4.732***  -4.555*** -4.545*** 
Constant  14.271 15.739  -10.887 -9.360 
       
R-squared  0.127 0.128  0.142 0.143 
N  1,595 1,595  1,595 1,595 
N-Clusters   67 67  67 67 
Notes: Results of the OLS estimations of the following equations: 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 FCSTERR + <controls> (Model 1) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 POST + 2 FCSTERR + <controls> (Model 2) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 FCSTERR*D_NEG + 1 FCSTERR*D_POS + <controls> (Model 3) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 POST + 2 FCSTERR*D_NEG + 3 FCSTERR*D_POS + <controls> (Model 4) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) 
and two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
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PANEL B: Supplemental Analysis: Production Changes   
 
Pred. 
sign 
DV: PROD_CHANGE 
 Without POST 
Without Beg 
INVENTORY 
Full model 
 Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model 3) 
POST          0.110 -0.011  
       
Beg INVENTORY  -  -0.030***  -0.030***  
       
AI_FCASTDIFF   0.049* 0.041 0.049*  
AI_ALLOCATION   0.020 0.020 0.020  
GMPCT   -0.096*** -0.085*** -0.095***  
SALES VALUE   0.197 0.219 0.199  
QUANTITY (1,000s)   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
PPI   0.059** 0.056** 0.059**  
Month indicators   yes yes yes  
LAGPROD_CHANGE   0.027 0.029 0.027  
TREND   -0.018* -0.023** -0.018*  
TREND2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
AI_PRODUCTS   0.048 0.027 0.048  
AI_LIFECYCLE   0.005 0.009 0.005  
NEW_PROD   -0.820** -0.895*** -0.817**  
EXPORT   -0.016 0.113 -0.016  
Constant   -8.890** -8.632** -8.953**  
       
R-squared   0.052 0.045 0.052  
N   1,585 1,585 1,585  
N-Clusters    67 67 67  
Notes: Results of the OLS estimations of the following equations: 
PROD_CHANGES = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (Model 1) 
PROD_CHANGES = 0 + 1 Beg INVENTORY  + <controls> (Model 2) 
PROD_CHANGES = 0 + 1 POST + 2 Beg INVENTORY  + <controls> (Model 3) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) 
and two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
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Table 5  Product Fixed Effects Estimation  
 
Panel A: Fixed Effects Models for Absolute Forecast Error (H1a, H1b) and Forecast Error Direction (H2a, H2b) 
 
  DV: FCSTERR  DV: FCSTDIR (positive vs. negative) 
  
Pred. 
sign 
  AI_FCSTDIFF Subsamples    AI_ALLOCATION Subsamples 
 Variables 
Model (1) 
 
 
Model (2) 
Low Diff 
Model (3) 
High Diff 
 
Model (4) 
 
 
Model (5) 
Low Incentive 
Model (6) 
High Incentive 
POST - -0.452  0.386 -1.371**  -0.829***  -1.263** -0.530 
           
AI_FCSTDIFF           
AI_ALLOCATION           
GMPCT  -0.888  -2.579 0.686  0.305  0.492 6.842* 
SALES VALUE  21.256  941.286* 8.954  36.514  -89.149 108.661 
QUANTITY (1,000s)  0.001  0.001 0.001  0.002***  0.003*** 0.002*** 
PPI  -0.032  -0.083** 0.038  0.026  0.055 0.027 
Month indicators  yes  yes yes  yes  yes yes 
TREND  0.062***  0.079*** 0.035  0.035***  -0.003 0.041** 
TREND2  -0.001  -0.001* -0.002**  -0.000  -0.000 -0.001 
AI_PRODUCTS           
AI_LIFECYCLE           
NEW_PROD           
EXPORT           
Constant  6.564  15.757** -12.100  -4.409  -9.543 -53.103 
Product fixed effects  yes  yes yes  yes  yes yes 
           
Pseudo R-squared  0.035  0.027 0.056  0.244  0.257 0.273 
N  1,595  888 707  1,595  709 886 
Notes: Models 1-3 are the results of the OLS estimations of the following equation with product fixed effects: 
FCSTERR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (Models 1-3) 
Models 4-6 are the coefficient estimation results of the following equation using multinomial logistic regression with product fixed effects (coefficients are for the comparison 
of positive vs. negative errors):  
FCSTDIR = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (Models 4-6) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise.  
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Panel B: Fixed Effects Models for Beginning Inventory (H3)   
 
 Pred. 
sign 
DV: Beg INVENTORY 
 Variables Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) 
POST -    -4.972*** -4.886*** 
       
FCSTERR  + 0.238***   0.232***  
FCSTERR * D_NEG -  -0.758   -0.509 
FCSTERR * D_POS +  0.219***   0.218*** 
       
AI_FCASTDIFF       
AI_ALLOCATION       
GMPCT  15.160*** 14.913***  14.644*** 14.468*** 
SALES VALUE  101.793* 102.829*  55.904 57.464 
QUANTITY (1,000s)  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
PPI  -0.149*** -0.154***  -0.045 -0.051 
Month indicators  yes yes  yes yes 
TREND  0.150*** 0.150***  0.257*** 0.255*** 
TREND2  0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000 
AI_PRODUCTS       
AI_LIFECYCLE       
NEW_PROD       
EXPORT       
Constant  44.721*** 46.078***  29.096*** 30.373*** 
Product fixed effects  yes yes  yes yes 
       
Pseudo R-squared  0.102 0.102  0.106 0.106 
N  1,595 1,595  1,595 1,595 
Notes: Results of the OLS estimations of the following equations with product fixed effects: 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 FCSTERR + <controls> (Model 1) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 POST + 2 FCSTERR + <controls> (Model 2) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 FCSTERR*D_NEG + 1 FCSTERR*D_POS + <controls> (Model 3) 
Beg INVENTORY = 0 + 1 POST + 2 FCSTERR*D_NEG + 3 FCSTERR*D_POS + <controls> (Model 4) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) 
and two-tailed otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted 
signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise.  
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PANEL C: Test of Hypothesis H3b: Production Changes   
 
Pred. 
sign 
DV: PROD_CHANGE 
 Without POST 
Without Beg 
INVENTORY 
Full model 
 Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
POST    -0.235 -0.416  
       
Beg INVENTORY  -  -0.036***  -0.039***  
       
AI_FCASTDIFF       
AI_ALLOCATION       
GMPCT   -0.821 -1.384 -0.803  
SALES VALUE   -16.963 -19.655 -16.963  
QUANTITY (1,000s)   0.001** 0.001** 0.001**  
PPI   0.058*** 0.068*** 0.067***  
Month indicators         yes       yes       yes  
LAGPROD_CHANGE   -0.028 -0.026 -0.026  
TREND   -0.010 -0.011 -0.001  
TREND2   -0.000 -0.001* -0.001  
AI_PRODUCTS       
AI_LIFECYCLE       
NEW_PROD       
EXPORT       
Constant   -7.276** -8.312** -8.256**  
       
R-squared   0.026 0.028 0.036  
N         1,585       1,585       1,585  
N-Clusters          67       67       67  
Notes: Results of the OLS estimations of the following equations with product fixed effects: 
PROD_CHANGES = 0 + 1 POST + <controls> (Model 1) 
PROD_CHANGES = 0 + 1 Beg INVENTORY  + <controls> (Model 2) 
PROD_CHANGES = 0 + 1 POST + 2 Beg INVENTORY  + <controls> (Model 3) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e., ‘(+)’ or ‘(-)’) 
and two-tailed otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
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Appendix Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Definition 
POST 1 for the post-introduction period (2008-2010), and 0 for the pre-
introduction period (2006-2007). 
 TREND 
TREND2 
 
 
Product-specific time trend (and squared time trend), starting with 1 in the 
month of product introduction.  
PPI Monthly Producer Price Index; measures the average change over time in 
the selling prices received by domestic producers for their output 
FCSTERR  
FCSTERR (signed) 
The absolute deviation of the Actual Sales (AS) from the three-month prior 
Forecasted Sales (FS), i.e., FCSTERR = |FS-AS|/AS. FCSTERR (signed) 
(reported in the descriptive statistics) is the signed forecast error (i.e., with 
negative values indicating under-forecasting and positive values indicating 
over-forecasting) .  
D_NEG Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for negative forecast errors (i.e., 
under forecast as indicated by FS < AS), and zero otherwise. 
D_POS Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for positive forecast errors (i.e., 
over forecast as indicated by FS > AS), and zero otherwise. 
FCSTDIR A multilevel variable capturing forecast direction equal to -1 for negative 
forecast errors, 0 for zero forecast errors, and 1 for positive forecast errors. 
Beg INVENTORY The number of months’ sales (i.e., inventory forward coverage based on 
actual subsequent sales) in finished goods (i.e., SKU-level) inventory, 
measured at the end of the month prior to the month of production. 
AI_FCSTDIFF Represents the difficulty of forecasting AI demand.  Higher values indicate 
the product is more difficult to forecast. This metric is as defined and used 
by the organization. 
AI_ALLOCATION Indicates the degree to which the AI is freely available on the market or a 
scarce resource that needs to be allocated across products sharing the AI.  
Higher values proxy for an increased incentive to positively bias the 
forecast. This metric is as defined and used by the organization. 
AI_PRODUCTS Captures the number of products that share a certain AI.  Higher values 
indicate greater complexity. Higher values indicate the product is more 
difficult to forecast. This metric is as defined and used by the organization. 
AI_LIFECYCLE Represents the complexity of the lifecycle management, with new (mature) 
products being most (least) complex and yielding the highest (lowest) score.  
Higher values indicate the product is more difficult to forecast. This metric 
is as defined and used by the organization.  
NEW_PROD Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for products introduced during 
the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
QUANTITY  Annual product-level budgeted sales quantity in liters. 
SALES_VALUE  Sales price per unit of measurement (e.g., liters, gallons) multiplied by the 
pack size (e.g., 100 liters, 2.5 gallons). 
GMPCT Ratio of gross margin per unit (i.e., sales price minus standard costs) and 
sales price per unit. 
EXPORT  1 if the product is sold outside the United States, and 0 otherwise. 
Ln PROD_CHANGE the absolute deviation of logged Actual Production (AP) from logged 
Planned Production (PP), i.e., Ln PROD_CHANGE = |Ln (AP + 1) – 
Ln(PP+1)| 
